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The Indian novelist Arun Joshi (b. 1939) has been following in the footsteps 
of philosophical novelists like Tolstoy and Dostoevsky.1 The moral problems of 
Rattan Rathor, the protagonist of The Apprentice (1974), are expanded and inten-
sified in the figure of Som Bhaskar, the antihero of The Last Labyrinth (1981). Both 
characters confront the same problems of alienation and identity, with one signifi-
cant difference: whereas Rattan Rathor finds an answer to his moral guilt and re-
turns to the community, Som Bhaskar fails to find answers to his moral and cul-
tural alienation and cannot return to society. The tragedy of Som Bhaskar is the 
tragedy of modern man who, being at odds with himself and his cultural environ-
ment, is confronted by moral and psychological fragmentation and by a persistent 
struggle between two worlds, two types of hunger: "Hunger of the body. Hunger of 
the spirit."2 This paper examines the dramatic conflict between the two intricate 
worlds of appearance and reality as portrayed in The Last Labyrinth as a basis of 
fictional discourse and as a structural principle of the narrative. 
In many ways, Som Bhaskar is a Freudian figure whose discontent with his 
civilization and with himself, reiterated in the frequently repeated expression, "I 
want. I want. I want" (78), defines the structural principle of the narrative. Som 
Bhaskar has received a prestigious education at Harvard, has inherited the family 
business and fortune after his father's death, and has become a comfortable mil-
lionaire at the age of twenty-five. Apparently, Bhaskar is fully at home with the 
Western intellectual tradition, and one of the central issues in the process of his 
self-discovery is the role of Indian religious thought. Will Bhaskar's scientism 
help him to understand Krishna? The narrative of The Last Labyrinth seems to be a 
continuous dialectical confrontation between the main currents of Western intel-
lectual thought and Indian religious thought, with one significant difference: 
Joshi's method of participating in the Western intellectual discourse is one of epis-
temological transvaluation. Considered in this context, The Last Labyrinth is es-
sentially a document in the history of ideas. One may argue that it is probably in-
evitable that writers like Mulk Raj Anand, Raja Rao, and Arun Joshi, to name 
only a few, would participate in the Western intellectual discourse. One could 
easily read in The Last Labyrinth the loose threads of Samuel Butler's argument be-
tween religion and science in The Way of All Flesh; and on the subjects of sex, love, 
In my discussion of Joshi's earlier work The Apprentice, I have pointed out the similarities between the 
narratives of Crime and Punishment and The Apprentice, especially the difficulty of fictional 
representations of life's larger issues and the interior quests pertaining to moral, psychological, and 
philosophical matters. See my essay "Alienation, Identity, and Structure in Arun Joshi's The Apprentice,'" 
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and women, D.H. Lawrence's Sons and havers bears a fairly plausible resemblance 
to Joshi's book. 
In his discriminating self-analysis, Bhaskar outlines the issues boldly and 
clearly: "I knew that money was dirt, a whore. So were the houses, cars, carpets. I 
knew of Krishna, of the lines he had spoken; of Buddha at Sarnath, under the full 
moon of July, setting in motion the wheel of Righteousness; of Pascal, on whom I 
did a paper at Harvard: 'Let us weigh the gain and loss in wagering that God is, 
let us estimate these two chances. If you gain, you gain all, if you lose, you lose 
nothing.' All this I knew and much else. And yet, at the age of thirty-five I could do 
no better than produce the same rusty cry: I want. I want" (11-12). Bhaskar had 
inherited the business and wealth at twenty-five, but now he is thirty-five. It is in-
teresting to note that during these ten years his perception of life has not changed 
and he seems, one would assume, to be getting closer to the idea of Krishna. He 
knew that the Pascalian thesis about the existence of God is distinctly different 
from Descartes's dualistic philosophy of matter and spirit. Leela Sabnis, a Ph.D. 
graduate from Michigan and a professor of philosophy, with whom Bhaskar has 
occasional sex, is a follower of Descartes. Sabnis explains somewhat assertively 
that in Descartes's philosophy the world of matter and the world of spirit are two 
separate worlds that cannot be united. Bhaskar is, of course, very quick to refer to 
the philosophy of Spinoza, according to whom "both matter and spirit embraced in 
God, and flowed from Him" (81). When Bhaskar undertakes the gruesome journey 
to the top of mountains to recover the shares of Aftab Rai's company, he meets 
Gargi, a mystic, who reminds Bhaskar that "there is no harm in believing that God 
exists" (213). And Bhaskar comments unreservedly and unintimidatedly: "So I was 
back with Pascal!... It is easier to believe that He does not exist" (213). 
Historically, Pascal's polemical reply to Descartes's controversial philoso-
phy rests on his theory of the wager or wagers, which is essentially epistemologi-
cal. Indeed, the characterization of Leela Sabnis and her rejection of Bhaskar is 
allegorical of Pascal's rejection of Descartes's ideas. It is true that for an adequate 
understanding of Pascal one must know Descartes or possibly Montaigne or even 
St. Augustine, the intellectual milieu of Pascal, but the fact remains that Joshi takes 
the complex epistemological and ontological debate to the seventeenth and eigh-
teenth centuries, and further to the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Signifi-
cantly, the debate centers on the reading of Bhaskar, a modern intellectual who 
has been deeply immersed in all these ideas—he even wrote a paper on Pascal— 
but who cannot accept Pascal's wager. Yet the paradox is that Bhaskar keeps on 
thinking about Krishna: "No, there was nothing simple about this thing. There was 
nothing simple about Krishna. Had it been so. He would not have survived ten 
thousand years. He would have died along with the gods of the Pharaohs, the 
Sumerians, the Incas. Krishna was about as simple as the labyrinths of Aftab's 
Haveli" (173). 
Bhaskar's father had also been searching for truth and the first cause. In a di-
alogue with Bhaskar, he says: "There was neither death nor immortality, then.... 
Who knows the truth? Who can tell whence and how arose the universe. The gods 
are later than its beginning: Who knows, therefore, whence comes this creation?" 
(155) Evidently, the argument about the first cause and about the Idea OT Reality is 
ancient in origin, although modern scientific thought has not helped to bridge the 
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gap between science and religion. But Bhaskar's father reminded his son that in 
the metaphysics of the first cause and the Spirit scientific reasoning is of very little 
or no help. The best poetic reconciliation in the narrative comes from Anuradha: 
"Maybe Krishna begins where Darwin left off" (132). But does Anuradha compre-
hend the intellectual implications of such a condensed restatement of the long de-
bate in the history of ideas—a sort of linear and direct unity and continuity be-
tween science and religion? Or is Joshi ironically suggesting the limits of science? 
In an answer to Aftab's question, Bhaskar states: "The point is that this Spirit is 
there. And if it is there, if Man has inherited it, then what is he to do with it?" 
(132) But he does not share Aftab's view that "it is a matter of visions." "Visions," 
remarks Bhaskar somewhat contemptuously, "are dime a dozen" (132). 
It is abundantly clear from the narrative that Bhaskar has constantly sub-
jected himself to rigorous and discursive self-analysis and at times this tyranniz-
ing process has proved to be primitive, demoralizing, and self-destructive. On his 
way to the temple in the mountains, he calls himself a leper, the one who "needed a 
cure" (126). His insatiable hunger for Anuradha, Aftab's mistress, his compulsive 
fornications, his puzzling relationship with his wife Geeta, and his powerful de-
sire to acquire control of Aftab's business only partially define his muddle. In fact, 
Leela Sabnis has frankly called him a fornicator and neurotic. But I believe that 
the serious conflict in the book is between the Cartesian world of reason and the 
world of intuition. Aftab Rai along with Anuradha, Gargi, and the dancing girls 
of Lai Haveli represent the mysterious world of intuition, of pain and pleasure 
and of balance and harmony. It is only in the context of the spiritual morality of 
Lai Haveli, including its labyrinths, that one can understand Anuradha's rela-
tionship with Aftab and Bhaskar, the pain of the history of Lai Haveli, and the 
impending takeover of Aftab's business by Bhaskar. 
It is virtually impossible for Bhaskar to understand the undaunted morality 
and complexity of Anuradha's statements—she says that she is not unfaithful to 
Aftab and declares that "you can't marry everyone you love" (43)—and her sacri-
ficial act of giving up her jewels and her shares in Aftab's company. Anuradha's 
conception of love belongs to the category of idealistic and spiritual love which 
implies the notions of goodness, sympathy, and sharing. Anuradha boldly empha-
sizes the obsolescence of the institution of marriage by disclosing somewhat 
laughingly that she has "never been married" (43), and later by commenting reflec-
tively: "I can imagine I am married to Aftab. I can imagine I am married to you. My 
mother used to imagine she was married to Krishna" (128). 
In contrast, Leela Sabnis's relationship with Bhaskar is very short-lived. She 
believes that the sexual act is concerned only with the body, the world of matter. 
Her ideologies of free love and feminism, it should be noted, are distinctly different 
from Anuradha's ideas of love and sexuality. Anuradha's incorruptible notion of 
love corresponds to the idea of love as bhakti (selfless devotion), a kind of love 
that is commonly understood in terms of the mythical legend of Krishna and his 
cohorts. The tragedy and the paradox are that Som Bhaskar and Leela Sabnis be-
long to the same materialistic world of empiricism, rationalism, and intellectual-
ism. Bhaskar is convinced that in Leela Sabnis's rational world "Descartes and 
tantras [do] not mix" (54). Although Leela Sabnis urges Bhaskar to understand and 
accept the Cartesian thesis, Bhaskar seems to believe firmly that "what [he] 
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needed, perhaps, was something, somebody, somewhere in which the two worlds 
combined" (82). 
In The Will to Power, Nietzsche divides the history of ideas into three cen-
turies: (1) "Aristocratism," the era of Cartesian reason and will; (2) "Feminism," the 
age of superiority and supremacy of feeling, as advanced by Rousseau; and (3) 
"Animalism," the era of Schopenhauerian will and therefore "the sovereignty of an-
imality.'9 "The nineteenth century," adds Nietzsche, "is more animalic and subter-
ranean, uglier, more realistic and vulgar, and precisely for that reason 'better,' 
'more honest'... but sad and full of dark cravings, but fatalistic" (WP 59). Consid-
ering that the twentieth century is only a logical extension of the nineteenth cen-
tury, we find that a work like The Last Labyrinth and the figure of Som Bhaskar 
belong to Nietzsche's third category. Som Bhaskar is honest and truthful about 
matters pertaining to his libidinousness and other desires and the ensuing moral 
and psychological problems. His life is blighted by an embarrassing and debasing 
vulgarity and an irrecoverable sense of vanity and urge for power. The more 
Bhaskar craves the gratification of his desires to gain control over Aftab's com-
pany and complete possession of Anuradha, the more excruciating and uglier the 
situation becomes. But Som Bhaskar can find neither the truth nor the remedy for 
his suffering, since he has combined sex with power, money, and authority. 
Bhaskar is no doubt familiar with Pascal's philosophical formulation of the 
relationship between moral conscience and the ability to comprehend truth, but 
his ravenous pursuit of the world of desire has destroyed his reasoning power. 
Evidently, the matter of ascertaining moral conscience has been expediently obvi-
ated, for the convoluted structure of reality in which Bhaskar's paraxeological 
values are defined, has no reference to such terms as conscience or moral con-
science. Money, wife, and children, successful business and prestigious education 
have given Som Bhaskar neither freedom nor happiness. The more he runs after 
Anuradha, the more he finds out the futility of the situation. After all, the central 
metaphor of Lai Haveli suggests an indecipherable and invincible illusion in 
which Bhaskar is caught as a helpless prisoner of Aftab's business and Anurad-
ha's sexuality. Earlier, Bhaskar was a prisoner of the Cartesian voids, the vacant 
spaces in nature and hence his own mind. And paradoxically, his business of 
manufacturing plastic pails is a monster that will devour his own creative ener-
gies. 
It may be argued that in a moralistic discourse the most gruesome situation in 
the structure of civilization represented by the narrative is Bhaskar's marriage to 
Geeta. Bhaskar, considering his own embarrassing deviations, frankly recognizes 
that Geeta too has every right to "the adulteries of the body," though she has "only 
taken to cleansing of the soul" (63). In accepting her position as the insignificant 
other and resigning herself to her husband's Don Juanish affairs with other 
women, Geeta has patronized Bhaskar's lustful indulgences, recognizing at the 
same time her own pathetic helplessness and self-deprecation. She has known 
about her husband's affair with Anuradha; in fact, during her husband's illness, 
Geeta and Anuradha had jointly prayed for his recovery. While Geeta suffers her 
•* Friedrich Nietzsche, The Will To Power, trans. W. Kaufmann and R.J. Hollingdale (1967. New York: 
Vintage, 1968) 58-59. All references are to this edition and will appear in the text after the abbreviation 
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husband's womanizing and boozing, Anuradha gets the upper hand in dealing 
with Aftab and Bhaskar. Although Gargi has called Anuradha Bhaskar's Shakti, 
Bhaskar rightly calls her his "dark and terrible love" (157), more in the sense of 
the Freudian id. Ironically, the tantric metaphor of Shakti for Anuradha remains 
incomplete, even dysfunctional. It is of course true that Anuradha electrifies, vivi-
fies, and controls Bhaskar's life, thus enabling Bhaskar to know his subconscious 
self.4 But as Eros she does not lead Bhaskar to the recognition of Krishna in him-
self. 
Bhaskar's unconquerable desire for Anuradha and Anuradha's own sexual-
ity are paradigmatic much more in the Freudian sense and the Jungian sense of the 
anima than in the Indian sense of the Shakti.5 The mythical-poetical world of Lai 
Haveli, with its mysterious voids and labyrinths, remains illusory to the scien-
tific-rational mind of Bhaskar, but it is undoubtedly Anuradha who, with her 
evocative physicality and sexuality, is the principal creator of illusion. One 
would surmise that Bhaskar's complete and perfect union with Anuradha could 
give him spiritual wholeness, the state in which sexual anxiety and spiritual con-
sciousness are fully integrated. But in this complex psychoanalytical-theological 
argument, Anuradha remains merely Bhaskar's projection. As Bhaskar acknowl-
edges somewhat helplessly: "There was more to her than met the eye. A world 
spinning all by itself. I was infatuated with this mysterious world" (189). 
Bhaskar, as is clear from the thrust of the narrative, cannot reconcile the worlds 
of ego and id. It must not be forgotten that Bhaskar's inexorable use of power to 
possess Aftab's business and Anuradha's person simply adds to her inextricabil-
ity. There is an obvious analogy between the two phases of the book: the first 
phase when Bhaskar simply tries to take over Aftab's business, and the second 
phase when Anuradha as the personification of Bhaskar's desire becomes the cre-
ator of illusion, the veil of Maya in the Schopenhauerian sense.6 Imprisoned in 
this world of Maya, Bhaskar has totally lost the focus and perspicacity of his 
own vision and will. While Bhaskar's own ego lets him believe that he can con-
quer the world around him, his unethical and unjust conduct of repressive domi-
nance and authoritarian tyranny clearly show the nature of degeneration in him. 
In his introduction to Pascal's Pensées, T.S. Eliot makes the following obser-
vation: "But I can think of no Christian writer, not Newman even, more to be com-
mended than Pascal to those who doubt, but who have the mind to conceive, and 
the sensibility to feel, the disorder, the futility, the meaninglessness, the mystery of 
life and suffering, and who can only find peace through the satisfaction of the 
whole being."7 But Nietszche in his shrewd observation has compared Pascal and 
Schopenhauer: '"Our inability to know the truth is the consequence of our corrup-
tion, our moral decay'; thus Pascal. And thus, at bottom, Schopenhauer. 'The 
deeper the corruption of reason, the more necessary the doctrine of salvation"' 
See Aran Joshi's own remarks cited by RJC Dhawan in The Fictional World of Arm /OSÄI (New Delhi: 
Classical Publishing Company, n.d.) 46. 
For the idea of Shakti in Indian thought see my essay "The Woman Figure in Blake and the Idea of 
Shakti in Indian Thought," Comparative literature Studies 27:3 (1990) 193-210. 
See Thomas Mann, "Schopenhauer," in his Essays of Three Decades, trans. H.T. Lowe-Porter (1947; 
New York: Knopf, 1968) 388ff. 
T.S. Eliot, Introduction, Pascal's Pensées (New York: Dutton, 1958) xix. Also see some very 
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( WP 52). I must also refer to Thomas Mann's famous essay in which he compares 
Schopenhauer with Freud. Freud's world of Id, as Mann explains, is very much 
identical with Schopenhauer's world as Will.8 Som Bhaskar's world, whether 
Freudian or Schopenhauerian or Pascalian, is a study of mental, moral, and emo-
tional disorder, resulting from man's inability to know the world of Id or the 
world as Will. The knowledge of Krishna or truth presupposes complete harmony 
of all discordant and hidden forces and the complete annihilation of the ego. 
Bhaskar cannot know Krishna because spiritual knowledge is an intuitive recog-
nition of the worlds of flesh and intellect, matter and spirit. Bhaskar's thinking is 
still divisive, fragmented, because he continues to seek logicality in the power of 
his uncontrollable desire and in the existence of the Spirit. The ironic difference 
between his mental and moral development is evident in his inability to read po-
etic mythology and symbolism in which Krishna and Shiva are symbolic centers of 
truth and consciousness. 
In his scientific and rational thinking Bhaskar can only interpret the third 
eye of Shiva as the third eye of the lizard Hatteria and Krishna only as a gas 
flame. It is only when the world of flesh, spirit, and intellect are unified that sexu-
ality, eroticism, and pleasure approximate the condition of truth. Pleasure consid-
ered in relation to itself or to any kind of power or power-wielding characteris-
tics is merely a form of indulgent sensuality. The worst type of vulgarity from 
which Bhaskar suffers is his senseless pride of wealth and intellectual superior-
ity, which obstructs his mind and heart from envisioning reality. His unbridled 
sensuality and invidious pride lead him only to despair and meaninglessness in 
life, and hence to the impulsive decision to commit suicide. Although it had become 
clear to him that "Leela Sabnis was a muddled creature. As muddled as me" (77) 
and that "like Aftab [he], too, had wanted to start life all over again" (169), he is 
unable to forge ahead. 
With the disintegration of Bhaskar's dream world, the narrative crumbles. 
Quite surprisingly, the narrative does not include any plans for the recovery and 
redemption of Som Bhaskar. One cannot help observing that in the conceptual 
framework of a poetic tragedy people like Som Bhaskar, Geeta, and Leela Sabnis 
are ineffective players. Nevertheless, Anuradha's sudden and unceremonial dis-
appearance from the narrative, Geeta's dehumanized existence, and Leela Sabnis's 
emaciated rationalism are a commentary on the vitiated social order of which Som 
Bhaskar is a tragic product. Bhaskar's lust for Anuradha has not changed into 
love, nor has his repugnant and vituperative attitude toward Aftab mellowed. 
Bhaskar's anxiety, fear, and pain, stemming from his own mental and emotional 
fragmentation, are clearly echoed in these lines: "Anuradha, if there is a God and if 
you have met Him and if He is willing to listen, then, Anuradha, my soul, tell Him, 
tell this God, to have mercy upon me. Tell Him I am weary. Of so many fears; so 
much doubting. Of this dark earth and these empty heavens" (223). 
Evidently, here one finds an element of the Kierkegaardian epistemology of 
experiencing truth and of expostulating that there is perhaps a greater power, 
even though the intermediary of this power is supposed to be Anuradha. Unable to 
comprehend the structure of reality, especially the matters of unity and continuity 
0
 Thomas Mann, "Freud and the Future," Essays of Three Decades 415ff. 
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and also of certitude, penetrability, and permanence, Bhaskar's clogged mind 
struggles with the problem of the limits of knowledge. Bhaskar has now finally 
come to realize that the gap between the self and reality cannot be closed. 
Bhaskar's self has been lost to the overabundance of fear and pain. Strangely, 
however, Bhaskar continues to wonder about the validity and meaning of these 
"strange mad thoughts": "Are they the harbingers, the pilot-escort, of melancholia? 
Of insanity? Of Faith?" (223) Of course, Bhaskar has not forgotten that his father 
had died of melancholia. Foucault points out that melancholia, variously consid-
ered from the sixteenth century to Descartes to modern times, is a form of disorder 
or madness.9 Nevertheless, melancholia and insanity belong to the realm of unrea-
son or non-reason—as perhaps does faith. But it remains to be argued if Bhaskar 
can recover from delirious madness and self-debilitating anxiety and fear. 
See Michael Foucault, Madness and Civilization: A History of Insanity in ike Age of Reason, trans. R. 
Howard (New York Random House, 1965), especially 117ff. 
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